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State Formation, Habitus, and National Character:  
Elias, Bourdieu, Polanyi, and Gellner and the 
Case of Asylum Seekers in Ireland 
Steven Loyal and Stephen Quilley ∗ 
Abstract: »Staatsbildung, Habitus und nationaler Charakter: Elias, Bourdieu, 
Polanyi und Gellner sowie der Fall von Asylsuchenden in Irland«. Synthesizing 
material derived from Norbert Elias, Pierre Bourdieu, Karl Polanyi, Max Weber, 
Benedict Anderson and Ernest Gellner, in Part I the concept of “national char-
acter” is delineated as a special case of “habitus” relating to the socio-spatial 
scale of the nation state. In relation to problems of state-formation, national 
character is shown to be a figurational and co-developmental function of the 
system of nation-states in which patterns of mutual identification and “imag-
ined community” involve both the coercive codification and internalization of 
particular national narratives and origin myths which define “people like us” in 
terms of a symbolic family; and also, in relation to competing nation-states, 
the projection and internalization of national group charisma and shame. In 
Part II, these ideas are applied to the pattern of state formation in Ireland and 
the recent history of the reception, cultural accommodation, and treatment of 
asylum seekers.
Keywords: Norbert Elias, Pierre Bourdieu, Ernest Gellner, state formation, habi-
tus, imagined community, asylum seekers.
1. Introduction 
The concept of “national character” remains a recurring trope of popular cul-
ture. As Anderson notes, the concept has “fallen into intellectual disgrace” 
since it can easily slide into caricatured prejudices and stereotypes, yet he adds: 
“there are no generalizations that seem in principle so indefensible, yet in prac-
tice so unavoidable” (Anderson 1992, 261). The first major writer to use the 
term systematically was Hume who attempted to show its changing nature in 
relation to political and economic circumstances: “each nation has a peculiar 
set of manners, and that some particular qualities are more frequently to be met 
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with among one people than their neighbours” (Hume 1987 [1742], 197). Such 
analysis was later taken forward in the work of Durkheim’s colleague, Alfred 
Fouille, in his Esquisse Psychlogique des Peuples Europeens in 1902, Ernest 
Barker’s National Character 1927, and the Austrian Marxist Otto Bauer, The 
Question of Nationalities and Social Democracy in 1924. He states:  
let us provisionally define national character as the complex of physical and 
mental characteristics that distinguishes one nation from others; beyond this, 
all peoples have those common characteristics that we mutually acknowledge 
as human, while on the other, hand the particular classes, professions and in-
dividuals of each nation have individual properties, special characteristics, that 
distinguish them from one another. (Bauer 2012 [1924], 40)  
Although difficult to operationalize as a basis for systematic comparative soci-
ology or social-psychology without falling prey to highly involved stereotypes, 
the idea of national character nevertheless remains, to some degree, indispen-
sable. In Part I of this essay, we synthesize overlapping ideas from a number of 
classic sociological accounts of state-formation, culture, and personality – to 
develop a theoretical account of national character as the particular inflexion in 
psychogenesis or habitus, such that modern individuals are to some significant 
degree “like some other people” – and where the “some” relates to citizens of a 
national territory, market, civic-legal domain, and language-culture. At the 
same time, they are like all other people qua common humanity; and no other 
people qua individuals (Murray and Kluckhohn 1948, 35 quoted in Mennell, 
2017, 5). In this sense the “some” of national character is different to the 
“some” associated with other social groupings that also generate patterns of 
exclusive mutual identification and habitus – in relation to for instance, class, 
race, sexuality, lifestyle, psychological disposition, religion, ethnicity, age, etc. 
(see Figure 3). 
In Part II we use these ideas to analyze the development of an Irish “national 
habitus.” Initially Catholic and rural – developing in response to a more power-
ful British colonial habitus – this “national character” altered as power balances 
shifted, especially after independence. In this new post-colonial context, immi-
gration increasingly became the negative figurational foil. 
In the process of state formation, the relation between the state and individ-
uals has developed (a) as a function of authority relations, as with the rationali-
zation of legal frameworks, the monopoly of violence and the extension of state 
regulation into family and community life; (b) as a function of the survival unit, 
as individuals became more dependent on the institutions of state and market 
and less on place-bound relations of family and community for economic and 
physical security; and (c) culture and identity, as mutual identification with the 
imagined community of nation became the dominant ideational habitus. 
Viewed over several centuries, it is argued that social inequality within West-
ern states has declined and power balances between social groups have equal-
ized. At the same time, increasing economic inequality between and within 
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states that has accompanied globalization and a policy environment dominated 
by neoliberalism and market retrenchment, represents a significant reversal of 
this long-term trajectory. Independently of the empirical situation, opinion 
polls show a consistent perception, among Europeans, that societies are becom-
ing less and not more equal (Khondker 2011, 3). Capitalism has always been 
“instituted” by nation-states (Polanyi 1957b), but as some writers have argued, 
Western state democracies are “hollowing out” and becoming more directly 
dominated by corporate license and less able to sustain distinctive internal 
regulatory environments and societal regimes (Jessop 2004). As a small open 
dependent economy, Ireland has become one of the most free-market, global-
ized economies in the world (Kearney 2004; KOF 2016). The implications of 
this understanding are explored for the post-war, Fordist state-society compact 
particularly viz-á-viz the arrival of increasing numbers of asylum seekers from 
the 1980s onwards. It is argued that the rise of populist and far-right parties and 
discourses across Europe is an indication of an intensifying scramble for re-
sources and reassertion of ethno-national status differentials by survival groups. 
In this light, social closure strategies are presented as an aspect of established-
outsider relations and ongoing attempts by different groups to secure not only 
economic and material resources such as private property, labour market ac-
cess, and welfare, but also social esteem and status distinctions in Ireland and 
elsewhere. Finally, it is argued that the arrival of asylum seekers and immi-
grants generally, and in Ireland in particular, has generated a number of struc-
tural contradictions or entrenched wicked dilemmas (i.e., paradoxical and ir-
reconcilable tensions between two or more cherished but irreconcilable 
priorities). Moreover, the state itself expresses these contradictions as a multi-
layered, multi-dimensional “entity in process,” a field of contradictory forces 
enshrined in various state departments with sometimes coherent, sometimes 
contradictory agendas concerning the distribution of economic resources, 
rights, opportunities, and recognition.  
2. Part I: Theories of National Character and Habitus in 
Relation to State Formation 
2.1  Culture and Personality 
As Mennell (2017) points out, the idea of national character is as old as nation-
states and nationalism, with derogatory name calling – les rosbifs, frogs, krauts, 
Napoleon’s “nation of shopkeepers” – a fixture of street-level international 
relations. But as Mennell argues echoing Klineberg (1950), neither De Tocque-
ville’s comparison of the democratic spirit of America with the aristocratic 
structure of feeling in France nor subsequent studies associated with the “cul-
ture and personality” school in Anthropology (Benedict 1946; Gorer 1949; 
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For Elias (1978), during the long-term process of human development, three 
sets of controls – ecological controls over non-human nature, social controls 
over others and psychological controls over self – develop in tandem. In On the 
Process of Civilization, Elias explored a particular phase in the European civi-
lizing process in which the sociogenesis of patterns of exchange, interdepend-
ency between individuals and groups, socio-legal regulation and political au-
thority engendered the identifiable processes of psychogenesis associated with 
individualization and the emergence of the novel structure of personality that is 
intimated by concepts such as homo economicus (or what Elias calls Homo 
clausus – 2010), the thinking subject of Cartesian philosophy, the autonomous 
moral agent of post-reformation Christianity, and the sovereign citizen of dem-
ocratic and liberal theory. 
An important aspect of this process relates to what Elias (2010) calls the 
I/We balance. The disembedding of a more spatially and socially mobile indi-
vidual from the ascriptive and place-bound patterns of life characteristic of 
traditional agrarian societies, saw a marked shift towards the “I” – a process 
that Weber and subsequent commentators described as individualization. This 
aspect of modernity has dominated both the sociological and popular imagina-
tions, associated with problems of anomie and subjective dislocation, aliena-
tion, disenchantment and rationalization (in Marx, Weber, Durkheim, Tonnies, 
etc.) and more recently narcissism (Lasch 1979; Twenge and Campbell 2010) a 
loss of meaning and ontological security (variously Laing 1962; Becker 1973; 
Giddens 1991), and the reflexive modernization associated with “risk society” 
(Giddens 1991; Beck 1992). 
However, contrary to the Homo clausus imagery ingrained in both popular 
narratives of modernity and the methodological individualist methodology of 
social and economic science – the “we” does not disappear. Rather the chang-
ing I/We balance shifts the locus of the “we layer” (Elias 2013, 24) of mutual 
identification away from family, place, and community to higher level and 
more abstract forms of “imagined community” (Anderson 1992) associated 
with the nation-state but also in many cases with all sorts of other collectivities 
predicated on religion, ethnicity, and even sport and leisure. This does not 
imply that the other “we” levels disappear, only that they become submerged or 
interact in a further increasingly dominant modality of identification. Critically, 
in more complex societies it is such higher-level we-identities that cohere as 
“survival units” (Elias 2010). Thus, for instance, in a modern society the indi-
vidual relies on the institutions of state and market for economic and physical 
security (e.g., social insurance, healthcare, police protection, income from 
employment, private insurance) much more than extended family or neigh-
bours. So, the propensity for we/they or insider/outsider binaries is almost 
certainly an innate facet of the evolved architecture of human social relations, 
forged in the pattern of “fission and fusion” characteristic of both primates and 
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human band and tribal societies (Evans-Pritchard 1940; Aureli et al. 2008).  
But the scale and the particular manner in which this dynamic is expressed in 
human societies is very much a function of culturally defined conceptions of 
community and “survival unit” (Elias and Scotson 2008; Quilley 2009). Com-
plex societies engender multiple dynamic interrelated “we” identifications. As 
Mennell argues “processes of habitus formation […] are by no means confined 
to national groups and ‘national character’” (Mennell 2017, 5 emphasis in 
original). Nevertheless, the “imagined community” of nation (Anderson 1992) 
remains stubbornly persistent and for the majority in most national societies, 
perhaps the dominant locus for mutual identification. This is almost certainly 
because, as Mennell suggests (1994), the most significant we-identity usually 
coincides with what Elias refers to as the “survival unit,” i.e., the largest group 
upon which an individual depends in order to secure the material resources, 
physical security, and means of orientation necessary for survival (Elias 2010, 
182-9; 195-207). 
For Elias the concept of habitus is synonymous with “second nature,” which 
is to say all those patterns of behaviour, orienting and cognitive categories, 
structures of psychological restraint, and cultural taboos that a child absorbs as 
a function of socialization or enculturation in a particular society – patterns that 
are so deeply engrained the neurogenic and somatic “muscle memory” as to be 
autonomic and largely unconscious in their operation and effect and so taken 
for granted as to appear natural to the individuals involved. Equally for Bour-
dieu, drawing on Merleau-Ponty’s notion of bodily schema and motor inten-
tionality, habitus is the structured dispositions functioning as structuring dispo-
sitions expressed in our social practices (Bourdieu 1977) again increasingly 
tied to state formation (2014). 
Because survival units have, for the most part, increased in scale over the 
course of social development (as a function of the advancing triad of controls), 
from the 19th century the nation-state became an unavoidable and dominant 
form of social organization. For this reason, the national habitus has become 
the overarching concern for sociologists such as Norbert Elias and others pre-
occupied with comparative modernization.  
4.  The Formation of Individuals, Markets, Nations, and 
States 
The homo clausus image of the modern personality is both accurate and, as 
Elias (2010) pointed out, misleading. Social psychological research has shown 
that the perception of autonomy and individual agency, even in modern liberal 
societies, greatly underplays the relational nature of the self- and the extent to 
which the self is evoked by social context and interaction with other selves. 
This was one of the key findings of George Herbert Mead (1937), and later 
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Erving Goffman (1959), and has been reinforced by Ross and Nisbet (1991) 
ground breaking study of the influence of situations and social context on indi-
vidual decision making and cognition. But at the same time, the process of 
individualization described in detail by Weber and many subsequent sociolo-
gists (e.g., Beck 1992, ch. 5) has certainly transformed all aspects of social life. 
Modern society is first and foremost, as Elias put it, a society of individuals.  
It is also critical to understand the relation between the process of individu-
alization and, on the one hand, the great waxing of the two central institutions 
of modern society, namely the market and the state, and the waning of the 
domain of “livelihood” associated with householding (autarchy) and patterns of 
reciprocity and gift exchange on the other. In his ground-breaking study (1944; 
1968), Karl Polanyi described the central dynamic during early-modern capital-
ism was the disembedding of “economic” activity as a distinct domain, identi-
fiable and separate from the wider cultural, religious, social, and political insti-
tutions of society. Whilst forms of market exchange are a feature of all 
recorded human societies, it is only with the appearance of the self-regulating 
market economy “directed by market prices and nothing but market prices” 
(ibid., 45) that the process of provisioning and livelihood comes to be orga-
nized almost entirely around individual incentives for economic gain. It is only 
with such disembedded forms of economy that resources are able to flow freely 
with a view to maximizing such gains. Hitherto invisible and indivisible from 
other dimensions of culture and politics, the substantive matrices of group 
activity associated with the provisioning of communities become a separate, 
visible, and self-referential sphere, the domain of formal economics. With the 
emergence of the self-regulating market, “not blood tie, legal compulsion, 
religious obligation, fealty or magic [compel] participation in economic life, 
but specifically economic institutions such as private enterprise and the wage 
system” (Polanyi 1968, 81).  
Drawing on the economic anthropology of Malinowski (1922), Firth (1951), 
Thurnwald (1935), and Mead (1937), Polanyi showed that in all previous agrar-
ian, horticultural, and hunter-gathering societies, the economy does not exist as 
a visible, comprehensible, and separate domain “as such.” Individual activity 
associated with provisioning and livelihood was motivated primarily by the 
need to safeguard social standing and status, to fulfil ongoing patterns of 
(symmetrical) reciprocation or (asymmetrical) redistribution. The individual is 
a personalized rather than an “anonymous economic factor” (Firth 1951, 137). 
The integrating principles of house-holding (autarchy), reciprocity (symmet-
rical non-market exchange), redistribution (asymmetrical transfers between 
more and less powerful actors), and market exchange were combined and 
weighted, argued Polanyi (1968), in different ways in different societies. But in 
most cases, trade was highly regulated and genuine price-setting markets 
played a supplementary and marginal role.  
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The gradual disembedding of economic activity during the early modern pe-
riod was associated principally with the creation of “fictitious commodities” in 
labour and land, fictitious because they were either not produced in the first 
place (land), or not produced for sale (labour). Even into the early modern 
period, there were binding customary and legal limitations on market transac-
tions involving land and labour.  
In England, the trauma occasioned by the enclosure movement, which gath-
ered pace after the Civil War and peaked toward the turn of the 19th century, 
was a consequence of the wholesale removal of such limitations. With regard 
to land, this involved the stripping away of cross-cutting interdependencies, 
rights, and obligations of the commons, which ensured that usage did not coin-
cide with legal tenure. Citing Bentham’s view that the prosperity of agriculture 
(read capitalist modernization) was facilitated to the extent that “there are no 
entails, no inalienable endowments, no common lands, no rights or redemp-
tions, no tithes” (1944, 189), Polanyi suggested that this process of “disembed-
ding” was deliberate and strategic in nature. With regard to labour, the combi-
nation of enclosure and “emancipation” removed the substantive moral right to 
subsistence attached to group membership. 
5.  Individualism and the Fibre of Modern Institutions  
Polanyi (1944) argues that the project of liberal society was a utopian project 
which, because markets are so corrosive of social and natural capital, could 
never have been completed without completely destroying the social and eco-
logical basis of society (the reproduction of labour and nature respectively). 
Nevertheless, it was certainly the case that through the process of capitalist 
modernization, European societies became progressively more like the ideal 
typical market society, with individuals ever more cut off from the traditional 
lattice of mutual aid and obligation (livelihood) and more dependent on the 
market. What he referred to as the “countervailing movement of societal pro-
tection” did not re-instate traditional survival units but rather consolidated a 
new matrix of market and state in which the spatially and socially mobile indi-
vidual remained the principle unit (see Figures 2 and 3). In the century between 
1850 and 1950, this market-state society was consolidated as the Keynesian 
welfare state and various incarnations of the mixed economy (Esping-Anderson 
1990; Quilley 2012). 
The “original sin,” then, of liberal societies is this violent process of disem-
bedding of traditional forms of livelihood, the destruction of clan tribal and 
place-bound we-identities and forms of association that represent a challenge to 
the emerging nation state. Peasants migrating into the fast-growing cities be-
came “free” to move, change occupations, enter into contractual arrangements, 
and sell and (less often) buy their own or others’ labour power. The emerging 
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society of individuals simultaneously became a necessary prerequisite and also 
an ideal-typical exemplar for a whole range of archetypically and mutually 
reinforcing, modern cultural and institutional forms in the domains of econo-
my, law, democratic citizenship, philosophy, religion, and even medicine.  
Through this ontological bricolage across innumerable cross-cutting fields, 
the individual as a unit of analysis, of cognition and as a principle of organiza-
tion becomes so mutually reinforcing and pervasive as to appear “natural” and 
conform to what Elias referred to as our “second nature” or “habitus” – cultur-
ally acquired patterns of behaviour and cognition that are so deeply engrained 
as to become sufficiently automatic and pre-cognitive as to appear instinctive 
and an aspect of human nature (Elias 2012, 109, 117; Mennell and Linklater 
2010, fn 74).  
Figure 2: The National Society of Individuals as the Primary Survival Unit 
 
 
But perception and empirical reality notwithstanding, this habitus, by defini-
tion, only emerges in the context of complex, individuated societies where 
there is (i.) sufficient population density and economic surplus being generated 
as to make possible the formation of a state – a repository of political and 
sometimes religious authority with power over individuals (Marx 1906; Skopol 
1979; Barrington Moore 1966, Perelman 2000); (ii.) a society in which indi-
viduals experience such spatial, occupational, and social mobility as to be 
significantly detached from place-bound, kinship, and tribally rooted survival 
units; and (iii.) that mechanisms exist through either or both economy and state, 
to provide some kind of guarantee or social support outside of the traditional 
constellations of family/place. 
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6.  Monopoly and Social Closure 
Not only is nationality tied to sovereignty – control over a fixed, delimited 
territory – but both processes can also be connected to processes of monopoli-
zation and social closure. For Weber, the central criterion defining the modern 
nation-state was that it possessed a near monopoly over the legitimate means of 
violence (Weber 1978). Such a view was extended by Elias, who posits a mo-
nopoly of violence and taxation (Elias 2000); by Bourdieu, who pivots his 
definition of the state in terms of the monopoly of physical and symbolic vio-
lence; by Gellner, who emphasized the constitutive monopoly of acculturation 
and exo-education (1983); and by Torpey (1998, 2000), who highlights the 
monopoly of movement (Torpey 1998, 2000). Tied to this process of monopoli-
zation are processes of social closure (Weber 1978) or “established-outsider 
relations” (Elias and Scotson 2008) which take as their foundation power 
struggles.  
For Weber, such processes of closure are tied to the formation of “status 
groups,” that is, “a plurality of persons who, within a larger group, successfully 
claim [...] a special social esteem” (Weber 1968, 306). Such stratification by 
status is inextricably linked to the monopolization of ideal or material goods or 
opportunities (Weber 1968, 935). They reflect the competition for social, polit-
ical, and economic interests–economic and social esteem. Status groups divide 
collectivities into insiders and outsiders, members and non-members, in order 
to facilitate processes of monopolization and exclusion. As Weber argues, a 
variety of (racial, linguistic, religious, social, geographical) characteristics can 
be used as a pretext for exclusion – “whatever suggests itself most easily is 
seized upon.” Now, putting aside their own internal rivalries, “jointly acting 
competitors” form an “interest group” towards outsiders, and there is a strong 
tendency for the interests of this group to be rationalized and elaborated in law, 
administrative procedures, and so on (Weber 1968, 341f.).  
Weber recognizes that status groups have often drawn on the state to pro-
vide support to maintain their domination and privilege. But in some ways it is 
useful to look upon the modern state itself as a large-scale status group:  
as the organized dimension of a giant status group constituted by the entire cit-
izenry. To the extent that this picture is appropriate, the citizens may then be 
considered as an excluding group acting collectively to monopolize the re-
sources of a territory and the material and institutional infrastructures that 
arise upon it. (Barnes 1995, 146)  
Even if this citizenry is large and riven with conflicts, internal instability, and 
divisions, and even though not all members will directly interact with one 
another, there may exist representatives – mobile individuals, politicians, 
community leaders, and so on – who are concerned with aligning the pattern of 
affective we-identification and cognition between groups. 
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Ethno-nationality and national belonging, along with ideas of sovereignty 
and citizenship, then can be understood as a form of status exclusivity enacted 
by status groups. Given this pattern of competing national survival units, we 
can understand attempts by states to prevent the entry of immigrants generally, 
and asylum seekers in particular, as not merely assertions of their right to con-
trol their borders, but also as part of the wider process of social closure and the 
monopolization of resources for specific members. 
7.  Language, Culture, and Nation 
The nation-state and the society of individuals emerged in tandem. The process 
of disembedding and individuation synonymous with capitalist modernization 
have often been violent and necessarily coercive; but such processes seem to be 
a necessary and unavoidable prerequisite for functioning liberal democracies 
predicated on the idea of citizenship and some broader notion of human rights. 
Attempts to reverse this developmental sequence and use democracy and a 
culture of rights as a lever to promote market society and development have 
often proved spectacular failures – the most egregious examples being the 
forced democratization of Iraq and Afghanistan after Western military occupa-
tion. It is worth emphasising the coercive nature of the social and psychological 
processes involved in democratization. In Nations and Nationalism (1983), 
Gellner characterised the process in terms of cultural homogenization, where 
one of many competing potential language-cultures achieves dominance and is 
elevated to the status of a monopolistic “high culture.” A relatively homogene-
ous “national container” is necessary for institutions of democracy and market 
to operate effectively with one language, one set of laws, one set of weights 
and measures, standardized time, shared normative expectations, and patterns 
of etiquette. In order to effect this transformation, nation states typically re-
place local, contextual, informal, familial patterns of education and accultura-
tion in which children learn “on the job,” with “exo-education,” i.e., standard-
ized and rationalized patterns of education conducted by trained teachers in the 
context of formal schools and universities acting as agencies of the state (see 
also Bourdieu 2014). Variations of this pattern include British public schools 
(turning the sons of former local warrior leaders into a national officer class), 
progressive prison systems, military training regimes, universities, and tribal 
residential schools in places such as Canada, India, and Indonesia. 
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8.  Imagined Community, Legitimation, and the Dynamics 
of Group Charisma/Shame 
For the society of individuals to function effectively as a survival unit, the 
market has been supplemented by the institutions of the nation-state. The social 
compact established by western states and an increasing number of middle-
income countries in the global south hinges on mechanisms of taxation and 
redistribution. It is necessary for such fiscal transfers to be perceived as normal, 
conventional, unremarkable, and legitimate rather than extortion and robbery. 
To the extent that this is the case, the state machinery can operate by consen-
sus, with the monopoly of violence retreating into the background. Perhaps the 
most essential prerequisite for this is the construction of what Anderson fa-
mously referred to as an “imagined community” (1992). The nation has to 
become an abstract incarnation of family and community at a higher spatial 
scale – a form of family that can absorb new members into what is an exclu-
sive, membership-based club. Citizenship functions as both an instrument and 
object of social closure (Brubaker 1992, 181). The architecture and parapherna-
lia of borders, passports, and national insurance numbers is all designed to 
consolidate this particular pattern of mutual identification and “we identity” 
(Torpey 2000; Elias 2010). Because the principal and defining feature of the 
nation-state is its claim to be a “spatially comprehensive” structure of authority 
and regulation, it can never be indifferent to movement across borders (Bru-
baker 1992, 25). The “invention of tradition” and defined national cultures 
from the continuous mingling blush of local and peasant ways of being func-
tion in the same way, primarily to construe citizenship as a quasi-familial struc-
ture of belonging and obligation (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983; Thompson 
1991). 
Clearly the dominance of this dyadic relation between the individual and the 
market/state does not eliminate group dynamics, patterns of mutual identifica-
tion, or habitus formation at lower (or even higher) spatial scales. The precise 
relationship between national, class and ethnic, individual, and state processes 
and identifications remains contingent and open-ended (Hall 2017).  
One corollary of this pattern turns on the innate human propensity for the 
binary construction of in-group and out-group identifications. Elias and 
Scotson’s (2008) study of established and outsider dynamics demonstrated the 
extent to which culture involves the exacting of narratives and psychological 
projection of both positive and negative values onto “we” and “they” groups, 
and the internalization of both group-charisma and group-shame among domi-
nant and subaltern groups respectively. The critical thing is the unequal power 
ratio between these groups, which is itself determined by the way in which they 
are bonded together, their different degree of organization and cohesion, and 
the function one group or individual has for the other. Hence, when examining 
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the status and life chances of asylum seekers in terms of “established-outsider” 
relationships, power cannot be explained only in terms of the monopolization 
of physical resources by one group (Elias and Scotson 2008). Also important is 
the degree of organization, modes of orientation, internal cohesion, and social 
capital of the social groups concerned. But this relation is, as we shall argue, 
mediated by a national habitus instilled and regulated in the citizen population 
by the Irish state. Given the historical reality that (i.) particular nation-states 
emerge by definition within a system of competing/cooperating states and (ii.) 
that established/outsider dynamics are intrinsic to the exclusive category of 
citizenship (Loyal and Quilley 2017a; 2017b), it seems also that some or other 
versions of nationalism are an unavoidable concomitant of stable capitalist 
democracies. At the same time, this form of we-identification can be chan-
nelled along more or less ethno-nativist or civic lines, depending on the narra-
tive basis of mutual identification and the resources available for different 
imaginings of shared origin and destiny.  
The process of top-down state nationalization is, however, only half of the 
story. To take root, nationalizing mythologies, categories, concepts, and stories 
need to be translated and re-inscribed into everyday local traditions, practices, 
and ways of acting-seeing-feeling, to use Durkheim’s Kantian expression, by 
individuals and groups. Such nationalist sentiments and categories must simul-
taneously displace antecedent (e.g., tribal, place-bound, land-based) ways of 
seeing and organizing the world (Bourdieu 2014). In this sense, processes of 
migration into hitherto relatively homogenous national cultures can be seen as 
reintroducing disparate and often dissonant ways of acting-seeing-feeling that 
are not yet synched with the national culture. Nationalism is therefore not 
something that is on the periphery that emerges intermittently in passionate but 
episodic displays of flag waving, protest, or revolution. It is rather ever-present 
and ubiquitous in substance of, and context for, routine and trivial activities. 
Nationalism is, in this way, “banal” and deeply embedded in contemporary 
ways of thinking and this is central to its reproduction (Billig 1995, 6). As a 
primary mode of attachment, the nation provides the central orchestrating “we-
identity” often mobilizing an extraordinary depth of emotions and feeling. It is 
the nation, constituted by individuals of formally equal worth, and conceived as 
an extended family, which both symbolically and practically constitutes a con-
dition of possibility for social solidarity. This is not to deny the variability of 
subjective attachment or locus of identification which varies within popula-
tions, and according to different contexts (Gramsci 1973). Central to the argu-
ments advanced here and enshrined in the idea of the nation and nation-state is 
the idea of sovereignty. By definition, democratic nation-states monopolize the 
process of government over a fixed territorial area, with the consent of the 
population. As sovereign organizational units, nation-states work most effec-
tively with a unified, culturally homogenous citizenry. As polities, nation-states 
are involved in boundary construction on an ongoing basis. The relationship 
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between the state, domestic citizens, and migrants/asylum seekers is that of 
prospective members of an exclusive club. 
9.  Part II: “State Power,” National Character, and the 
Reception of Asylum Seekers in Ireland 
Having discussed these issues conceptually, we now attempt to look at them 
substantively. Though consonant with the comparative theoretical framework 
advanced above, state formation in Ireland has been characterized by a very 
specific and path-dependent trajectory. As elsewhere, the political sociology of 
migration and asylum in Ireland can be understood in terms of the interface 
between processes of state formation, the political economy of capitalist mod-
ernization, and the legitimating function of cultural identity.  
The ideological/political conflict against British colonialism created another 
important historical factor in shaping the Irish national habitus: the level of 
pervasive and ongoing violence. Irish Catholics effectively lived under British 
Protestant rule and domination for centuries. Protestant privilege and domina-
tion led to frustration at the lack of political advancement and reform for Irish 
Catholics. This pattern of contained but unresolved grievance often resulted, 
over centuries, in both episodes of sporadic violence and periods of sustained 
conflict. The United Irishman’s rebellion in 1798 alone saw the loss of between 
30,000 – 100,000 lives. As Rafferty (2016, 24) notes: “At times violence in 
Ireland seemed endemic. It came in three forms: rural and ad hoc, intentional 
and directed against the landlords; politically inspired. Given that many were 
desperately poor there seemed little to lose in violent encounters with authori-
ty.” Such violence became a normalised part of the Fenian politics, where the 
Irish Republican Brotherhood (1858-1924), a widely supported political 
movement, fought for independence from Britain. It also became accepted by 
the more revolutionary parts of the succeeding Sinn Fein movement which 
arose in 1905. 
Elsewhere we have explored the pattern of Irish state formation in terms of 
four overlapping discursive and practical logics in which state formation and 
habitus structuration forms a central dimension (Loyal and Quilley 2017a; 
2018). 
i. The logic of capital accumulation: the mutual dependency between the 
state, more or less regulated markets, and the profitability of corpora-
tions. 
ii. The logic of ethnic/national identification, state formation, and state le-
gitimation, which is reflected in the overarching concern to maintain sov-
ereignty and control over the population through classificatory and law-
making activities and the formation and reproduction of a national char-
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acter – functions that Bourdieu refers to as the monopoly over symbolic 
violence.  
iii. The constitutional logic relating to enshrined liberal commitments and 
the rule of law. 
iv. The logic of civil society – that is, the social struggles of immigrants, 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and (established and outsider) 
groups supporting and challenging immigration.  
It is at the intersection of these four unfolding and shifting processes that we 
can understand the Irish state’s relation to immigration generally and asylum 
seekers in particular as a contested process of national character reformation. In 
this discussion focused on the problem of national character, we will concen-
trate on the logics (ii.) and (iv.). 
10.  Early Modern State Formation and Established-
Outsider Relations 
From the early-modern period, the formation of state and society in Ireland was 
dominated by the wider politics of the British state. As a function of this wider 
impulse towards the nationalization of British society, the Irish economy was 
constructed increasingly as a source of agricultural produce and cheap labour – 
with millions migrating to the industrial cities of northern England. The mo-
nopolies of violence, taxation, symbolic framing, education, and acculturation 
as well as movement (see above) characteristic of state formation, were all 
elaborated in relation to the structural imperatives of the expanding British 
imperial state. Specifically, the symbolic framing and official imaginary fo-
cused on the narratives of Imperial expansion and competition with rival Euro-
pean powers and expressed the unconscious but unambiguous priorities of the 
Anglo-Norman aristocracy and the political and kinship links that tied Anglo-
Irish landowners to the British establishment in London as well as provincial 
centres of power in Manchester, Glasgow, and Edinburgh. With regard to the 
imperative of homogenization and the imposition of a single high-culture, the 
institutions of “exo-education” (cf. Gellner) can be seen in development of 
English language schools, the exclusion of Gaelic, and the flow of upper- and 
middle-class children to public schools in Dublin and further afield in England. 
In this cultural configuration, the play of established-outsider relations was 
explicit in the racial/ethnicization of the Irish speaking peasantry as an “other” 
to be tamed and anglicized and never fully to be trusted – a sensibility very 
evident in the expression “beyond the pale.” In the period up to the famine, the 
cultural and state logic was in effect towards a version of the integration 
through industrialization and urbanization – exactly the pattern that was evident 
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with Irish peasants who ended up in the slums of places like Manchester’s 
“Little Ireland” as described by Engels (1844). 
As Gellner describes, this process of cultural homogenization is an intrinsic 
concomitant of state formation. In this sense, Irish Gaelic identity and culture 
was involved in an unequal competition with English as a potential locus for a 
national high-culture. This was a competition it could never win within the 
framework of an English dominated British nation state, and for much of the 
18th and 19th century, Gaelic culture remained on the back foot driven into the 
geographical and cultural peripheries of the island. Nevertheless, the process of 
cultural elimination was never complete. Ireland retained a distinctive cultural 
identity that was manifest not only in the Gaelic language, but in distinctive 
local traditions of music and dance (Ó hAllmhuráin 2016), folklore, a rich and 
distinctly Irish literary tradition in the English language, very identifiable na-
tional and regional accents and grammatical idiosyncrasies, and a keen sense of 
a national history and destiny articulated very much against the dominant Brit-
ish framing narrative. With regard to those established-outsider dynamics, 
these features of the Irish psycho-cultural landscape in the 19th century effec-
tively disrupted the integrity of the established caucus – because many in the 
political, religious, and cultural elites identified with aspects of this subaltern 
narrative and carried markers or traits of their mixed allegiances (for instance, 
an Irish accent). At the same time, they also inverted the logic of group charis-
ma/shame – with characteristically Fenian/Anglo-protestant traits (from the 
perspective of Protestants) being re-framed as subaltern virtues or domi-
nant/imperial vices. Thus, for instance, a projection of feckless and drunken 
irresponsibility was inverted as laid-back generosity of spirit and thrown back 
as uptight, humourlessness, etc.  
11.  Modern Irish Nationalism 
In the 19th century, Irish republican nationalism sought to align the aspirations 
and identity of middle-class Protestants with the Catholic majority, under the 
umbrella of the United Irishmen. Subsequently, nationalism took on a more 
ethno-political patina representing a white Celtic/ Gaelic, rural, and Catholic 
“folk” – a “race” defined in opposition to an urban, Anglo-Irish constituency 
that was construed as part of the British colonial project. This shift was driven 
in part by the independence movement led by Daniel O’Connell and under-
pinned by a national-cultural frame elaborated by the protestant nationalist, 
Thomas Davis. Although sectarian with regard to religion, O’Connell’s nation-
alism was highly progressive in terms of social class – an egalitarianism mani-
fested also in strong support for the anti-slavery movement. From the 1860s 
onwards, four major socio-economic ruptures transformed the context for na-
tionalist discourse. 
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i. An agricultural and economic revolution entailing a shift to small- and 
middle-sized farming.  
ii. The rise of mass education in the 1860s.  
iii. A devotional movement led by the Catholic Church.  
iv. An escalation in political mobilization and calls for independence led by 
Charles Stewart Parnell (Garvin 2006).  
Partition made it inevitable that Republican nationalism, in concert with the 
Church, continued to employ British colonialism, the monarchy, and Protes-
tantism as a negative frame of reference. Similarly, the version of nationhood 
epitomized by De Valera’s vision of national self-sufficiency and nativist cul-
tural integrity during and after the Second World War was very different to the 
cosmopolitan civic nationalism that emerged with the Celtic Tiger in the 1990s 
and its embrace of global capitalism. Since the 19th century, Irish culture has 
had a double aspect corresponding to a parallel socio-economic development. 
On the one hand, a small country with comparatively well-developed mass 
communications and national newspapers served by effective and compulsory 
educational institutions engendering high literacy rates and represented by a 
cohesive and metropolitan intellectual and business elite; on the other, a pre-
dominantly rural, religious, agricultural economy and provincial sensibilities. 
Drawing on Celtic mythology, elite political and cultural entrepreneurs, such as 
Yeats, elaborated a literary nationalism directed towards the professional mid-
dle class. Their efforts were matched by a no-less vigorous political republican-
ism, which prioritized a strategy of Gaelicization, advanced principally through 
Gaelic games and sports from below (Cronin 1999). This much more overtly 
anti-British discourse became increasingly institutionalized under De Valera, 
providing a cultural rationale for the more insular, protectionist, and rural-
focused economic policy. It was also codified in Irish law – for example, the 
Aliens and Citizenship Acts of 1935, as well in the Irish Constitution of 1937. 
At the same time, the idea of an atavistic economic and political nationalism 
giving way with greater integration into the global economy and political struc-
tures of the EU, to a more cosmopolitan and civic nationalism is rather simplis-
tic (Malesevic 2014a). Rather, as elsewhere in Europe, both people and institu-
tions remain “deeply committed to ideas and practices of nationhood” 
(Malesevic 2014a, 19). Since the 1950s, the administrative capacities and infra-
structural reach of the Irish State have expanded greatly. There has been a 
normalization of state institutions, and of the identity of Ireland as a legitimate 
and equal partner in the wider community of nation-states. As a result of this, 
more banal and perhaps comfortable forms of nationalism (Billig 1995) have 
begun to hold sway over more passionate and sectarian discourses defined 
through conflict with Britain. Institutions such as the state schools, the national 
television network Raidió Teilifís Éireann (RTE), print media, and universities 
facilitate the reproduction of highly coherent form of civic nationalism which 
both celebrates the origin myths of the independence movement, whilst com-
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bining this with a modern European identity that focuses more on culture than 
ethno-racial identity. Instances of nation-centric images and practices are 
“normalized, naturalised, routinized and taken for granted” (Malesevic 2014b, 
20). They are also reproduced in media discussions of asylum seekers, immi-
grants, and citizenship. 
12.  The Irish State and International Relations 
The history of the Irish State and its articulation with nationalism and national 
character is, however, also bound up inextricably with its foreign policy and 
relationship with the wider system of nation-states, initially in the struggle for 
independence, self-determination, and sovereignty, and subsequently with 
regard to the tension between the goal of economic autonomy and the need for 
growth. Given relations of interdependence, not even the most powerful states 
can pursue foreign policies irrespective of the interests and actions of other 
countries. Ireland’s foreign policy developed initially in relation to a pattern of 
conflict and cooperation with Britain. As Ronan Fanning (2000, 311) argues, 
the history of Irish foreign policy may be understood as consisting of three 
linked phases: (1) independence and assertion of political and economic auton-
omy; (2) the consolidation of the polity; and (3) the move from national isola-
tionism (a preoccupation with independence) to a more global and cosmopoli-
tan stance (the recognition of interdependence). 
When the State was finally admitted to the UN in 1955, it was almost im-
mediately drawn into the fold of the Western anti-communist coalition. Thus, 
the need for international recognition and prestige (Collins 1986), a strategy of 
peace and security, and the economic interests of a small state all combined to 
drive Ireland into increasingly global institutions. The irony was that although 
Ireland moved in this direction, primarily with a view to underpinning political 
and economic prestige and sovereignty, it was these same institutions, and 
particularly the UN, that drew Ireland reluctantly into a human rights agenda 
and policy. Initially, the State signed up to this agenda, with very little sense 
that it would present any kind of challenge to its sovereignty and or its right to 
structure and regulate its population given its protracted history of emigration. 
13.  Economic Development and National Identity 
Since the early 19th century, the development of both the economy and policy 
was always linked to the broader project of national self-determination and 
sovereignty. Over time an ideology of industrialization had become a legitimat-
ing narrative and rationale, underpinning national independence. However, real 
progress was limited (O’Hearn 2002, 105). 
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Thus, when political independence was finally achieved after the First 
World War, the Irish Free State inherited an economy misshapen by centuries’ 
colonial constraint, blighted by wide-scale poverty, dominated by the 
deadweight of impoverished agrarian regions, and marked by a legacy of indus-
trial underdevelopment. In order to achieve independent, autonomous econom-
ic development, the Free State followed the path of import substitution indus-
trialization (ISI). But given its developmental impediments and limited natural 
resources, the predominant focus was on agricultural production, which with 
Britain account for 92% of Irish exports (Allen 2016, 14). 
In the 1930s under De Valera, protectionist policies, including blanket pro-
hibitions on foreign investment resulted in a six-year trade war with Britain 
resolved only in 1938 with the Anglo-Irish Trade Agreement. This protectionist 
ethos resonated with Irish Catholicism and the strain of romantic traditional-
ism. Nevertheless, Britain remained Ireland’s largest trade partner by an over-
whelming margin. With the punt tied to sterling, room for manoeuvre was 
limited (O’Hearn 2002, 114). 
Following the Second World War, American influence exercised through 
the Marshall plan saw discretionary funding tied to trade liberalization. During 
the 1950s, Ireland moved gradually towards a more export-oriented economic 
strategy, establishing government agencies such as the Industrial Development 
Authority (IDA), the Export Board (EB), and the Industrial Grants Board, 
whose remit was to reduce dependence on Britain, boost manufacturing exports 
and attract (mainly American) inward investment (O’Hearn 2002; Allen 2016).  
Over many decades the consistent thrust of Irish policy was to move away from 
protectionism and aspirations of autonomy and to embrace foreign-led and 
dependent patterns of development, or what O’Hearn called “postcolonial 
reincorporation and re-peripheralisation, under US influence” (2002, 113). As 
prohibitions on foreign investment were dismantled, so the State also joined a 
series of international institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank (1957) 
and later the European Economic Community (EEC) (1973). This strategy of 
providing a heavily incentivized export platform for global corporations con-
tinued into the 1980s. The result was an economy increasingly bifurcated be-
tween large corporate facilities with large workforces producing for export and 
a domestic manufacturing sector dominated by much smaller family firms. 
Immigration remained rare, with emigration the norm until the late 1980s.  
13.1  The Celtic Tiger 
From the 1990s, Ireland experiences an unprecedented economic boom. The 
central precipitating factor was undoubtedly the influx of American corpora-
tions in the 1990s, all seeking a platform for entry to the expanding EU 
(O’Hearn 2003, 34-55). With aggressive cuts in corporation tax (at 12% this 
was one-quarter the rate of many countries in the EU), generous grants, very 
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light touch regulation, weak trade unions, and an educated English-speaking 
workforce, Ireland was well placed to ride the wave. The expanding manufac-
turing sector (principally in computers and IT, pharmaceuticals, soft drinks, 
and engineering) brought a new pattern of organizational culture and “flexible 
specialization” production methods, and such foreign direct investment (FDI) 
accounted for nearly half of industrial profits and GDP growth during the 
1990s (O’Hearn 2003; O’Riain 2004). By the end of the 1990s, Ireland had the 
fastest growing developed economy, the best job-creation record in the Organi-
zation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), doubling its in-
dustrial workforce in just over a decade, and dramatically reducing structural 
unemployment (O’Riain and Murray 2007, 248-64). This labour market suc-
cess continued with the labour force growing by 17% between 2001 and 2006 
(FAS 2007, 10). From the late 1990s onwards, much of this growth was in 
domestic manufacturing and services, underpinned by a construction boom. By 
2008, finance accounted for 14% of the workforce (Allen 2009, 40). But 2008 
also saw the collapse of the economy and the beginnings of a deep recession. 
We see a picture then of a stagnant economy developing dramatically from the 
1990s with an accelerated boom, falling back into an acute slump. 
14.  The Irish State’s Historical Reaction to Asylum Seekers 
We can now briefly examine the state’s treatment of immigration in a historical 
context by focusing on its treatment of Jewish refugees and the process of 
social closure aimed towards them. What we wish to demonstrate is the high 
degree of continuity and tradition characterizing the state’s stance towards 
immigration – representing a dialectic of continuity within discontinuity. The 
first piece of immigration legislation enacted by the state after independence 
was the Aliens Act of 1935 which drew heavily on the Aliens Restriction Act 
of 1914. As well as the Nationality and Citizenship Act (1935), this same year 
saw the President of the Free State draft the Constitution Amendment Bill. 
Writing at the time, De Valera commented that this legislative package “might 
together be regarded as comprising our whole nationality code” (De Valera, 14 
February 1935, Dail Debates). It is in this sense that these pieces of legislation, 
especially the Aliens and Citizenship Acts, constitute an integrated whole and 
need to be understood in relation to one another. As well as an instrumental-
rational response to the particular problems of immigration control, these acts 
can be seen as performative discourses whose purpose was also to shape a 
specific Irish national consciousness, or “national code” conceived, at least 
initially, primarily in opposition to Britishness. These acts constitute formal 
aspects of developing a national character. In some ways they can be read in 
the same way as Corrigan and Sayer (1985) conceive the establishment of 
Britishness, as an ongoing activity. The collective representations, ways in 
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which individuals are represented to themselves and the parameters through 
which they can identify, are simultaneously descriptive and moral:  
The repertoire of activities and institutions usually defined as “the State” are 
cultural forms central to bourgeois civilization: states, if the pun be forgiven, 
state [...] They define, in great detail, acceptable forms and images of social 
activity and individual and collective identity; they regulate, in empirically 
specifiable ways, much – very much, by the twentieth century – of social life. 
Indeed, in this sense “the state” never stops talking [...] Out of the vast range 
of human social capacities – possible ways in which social life could be lived- 
state activities more or less forcibly “encourage” some while suppressing, 
marginalizing, eroding, undermining others. Schooling for instance comes to 
stand for education, policing for order, voting for political participation. Fun-
damental social classifications, like age and gender, are enshrined in law, em-
bedded in institutions, routinized in administrative procedures and symbolized 
in rituals of state. Certain forms of activity are given the seal of approval, oth-
ers are situated beyond the pale. This has cumulative, and enormous, cultural 
consequences; consequences for how people identify (in many cases, have to 
identify) themselves and their “place” in the world. (Corrigan and Sayer 1985, 
3f.)  
The collective conscience the state regulates is always that of a dominant class, 
gender, and ethnicity idealising its conditions of rule as rules of individual 
conduct. Nationality, in turn, allows a categorisation of outsiders and others: 
“The state is not only external and objective but, internal and subjective”: “it 
works through us. It works above all through the myriad ways it collectively 
and individually (mis) represents us and variously “encourages,” cajoles and in 
the final analysis forces us to (mis) represent ourselves. Over the centuries the 
compass of this regulation has ever widened, and such regulation is (partly) 
constitutive of ‘available’ modes of being human” (1985, 180). In addition, 
they argue that making this conscience collective is always an accomplishment, 
a struggle against other moralities and other ways of seeing, which express “the 
historical experiences of the dominated” and because “society is not factually a 
unity these can never be fully erased” (1985, 85).  
Taken together, the provisions contained in this legislation demonstrated 
three criteria that have continued to shape immigration policy to this day: (1) 
an economic concern with the relative “costs and benefits” of migrants (e.g., 
scarce labour market skills vs competition with indigenous workers; welfare 
outlays vs increased tax base); (2) problems relating to state security, law, and 
(social) order (e.g., criminality, political subversion, social deviance, and “good 
character”); and (3) concerns relating to social cohesion and ethno-cultural-
racial and religious homogeneity (e.g., perceived compatibility with the indige-
nous population and the likelihood of integration). 
We can see the operation of these criteria, for example, with regard to the 
Irish State’s reaction to Jewish refugees which has been well documented 
(Keogh 1998; Goldstone 2000).  
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As a rural, economically undeveloped and geographically isolated state, few 
aliens let alone refugees had in fact sought sanctuary. In Joyce’s Ulysses a 
character remarks “Ireland, they say has the honour of being the only country 
which never persecuted the Jews” to which his interlocutor remarks “Because 
she never let them in.” After Hitler’s accession to power in 1933 and the pass-
ing of the Nuremberg Laws in 1935 which deprived Jews of employment and 
citizenship, making them stateless and often indigent numbers of Jews applying 
to Ireland began to increase. Pressure to accept refugees came principally from 
the Department of External Affairs, which was keen to increase Ireland’s pres-
tige and visibility in the international arena. Yet, such a stance was always 
ambiguous. When in 1936 the League of Nations attempted to establish the 
legal status of refugees coming from Germany, Ireland’s permanent envoy was 
notified that the powers of the Aliens Act should not be qualified (Keogh 1998, 
117). Writing to the DEA, the Departmental Secretary for the DoJ noted in 
passing that there should be no “additional obligations on the Saorstat in rela-
tion to such refugees” (Roche 1936). Hence in May 1937, Ireland refused to 
accept the League’s draft convention on the status of German refugees. Both 
the Department of Justice and the Department of Industry and Commerce were 
also adamantly opposed to any liberalization. In addition to national security 
concerns – Jews were associated with communism – there were deep-seated 
anxieties relating to competition in the labour market. With regard to entry 
conditions, procedures were therefore overtly racialized. It was repeatedly 
stated that Ireland could make no commitment to accepting refugees due to its 
unemployment situation, increasing population pressure, agricultural base, and 
lack of resources and there “not enough land to satisfy the needs of our own 
people” (Official Report of Plenary Session of Evian Conference, July 1938, 
cited in Keogh 1998, 119). 
Here, an implicit pact of solidarity between the modern nation-state and its 
national citizens concerning the distribution of limited collective goods in the 
context of economic stagnation is foregrounded in order to effect a process of 
closure. 
In presenting Jewish immigration as a threat to the social and economic or-
der, the Department of Justice revealed its state mindset: 
In general, I think that the Jewish community in this country should not be in-
creased by way of immigration [Although Ireland has no history of antisemi-
tism; …] there are anti-Jewish groups in the country which would only be too 
glad to [use labour market competition from Jewish migrants as] an excuse to 
start an anti-Jewish campaign […] Existing Jewish community in this country 
would be well advised … not to encourage Jewish immigration. (Ruttledge to 
Briscoe 1938 cited in Keogh 1998, 125)  
With an increase in the numbers of displaced Jews in the wake of repression in 
Germany, the DoJ remained intransigent and continued its illiberal policy of 
exclusion. Aliens generally would not be allowed to enter the state unless they 
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brought some economic benefit. But because they were stateless and had had 
much of their wealth confiscated, it was unlikely that Jews would be temporary 
entrants. Perceived as politically suspect with regard to Communist sympa-
thies, they were also deemed likely to be disruptive of the ethno-national order 
and likely to provoke anti-Semitic movements. The assumption was that “They 
do not assimilate with our own people but remain a sort of colony of a world-
wide Jewish community. This makes them a potential irritant in the body poli-
tic and has [elsewhere] led to disastrous results” (Roche to Moynihan 1946). 
The Minister for Justice used these arguments to justify allowing entry to a 
mere 60 Jewish refugees for the period between 1933 and 1946, at a time when 
the genocidal war had displaced almost 66 million people (Keogh 1998, 192). 
Certainly, such restrictions mirrored the restrictionary policies of many oth-
er nation-states in a context of global economic depression. In an age of in-
creasing nationalism, especially before and after the First World War, most 
governments believed that the presence of minority groups caused ethnic ten-
sions within the social and moral order of the nation-state, that is, they were an 
irritant to the imagined body politic. As Hobsbawm observed, in the context of 
“making the world safe from bolshevism [...] the basic principle of reordering 
the map was to create ethnic-linguistic nation states, according to the belief that 
nations had the right to self-determination” (Hobsbawm 1994, 31f.). The dark 
side of self-determination was precisely that groups that could not be made to 
fit into one of the nascent volk-nations were always in danger of becoming 
“denationalized.” It was in this context that racial ideologies became superim-
posed onto ethno-national ideologies. 
15.  Asylum Seekers in Contemporary Ireland and Europe 
By the end of the Cold War, asylum seekers were no longer viewed as sympa-
thetically nor used as ideological ballast to highlight the totalitarian nature of 
communist regimes in a Cold war context. Moreover, despite very different 
immigration policies, patterns of organizational incorporation, and traditions of 
citizenship and membership, all European states reacted negatively to the rising 
number of asylum claims (Marrus 1985; Geddes 2001). From the 1980s on-
wards, applications for asylum in Europe and North America increased more 
than nine-fold (Keely and Russell 1994), especially following the break-up of 
Bosnia. States responded by increasing restrictions and prioritizing deterrence 
measures – not least by breaking down the conceptual distinction between 
economic migrants and political refugees, and obscuring the latter with the 
powerful discursive binary of “bogus” versus ”genuine” refugees. During the 
1990s, most European states reacted to the growing flow of asylum seekers by 
seeking to contain them in their continent or region of origin, and/or to restrict 
their access into the West. Increasing hostility to these growing numbers during 
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the 1990s was matched by the anxiety-ridden ideological construction of asy-
lum seekers as opportunistic, an unnecessary burden on the finite national 
resources, and a threat to the cultural and national homogeneity. This reaction 
echoed the earlier nationalist retrenchment of Western states with the rise of the 
Nazis during the 1930s – a decision sealed at the 1938 Evian Conference, when 
Western governments effectively abandoned Germany and Austria’s Jews, 
arguing that their countries were already “saturated” with Jewish refugees 
(Marrus 1985). 
More specifically, the development of the asylum and immigration regime 
in Ireland can be explained by looking at the ways in which the interest and 
priorities of the State – embodied in various autonomous bureaucracies, inter-
acted with four logics mentioned in the introduction. With regard to (1) the 
logic of capital, from the 1980s onwards, government policy increasingly em-
phasized open borders and capital mobility. A corollary of this was that labour 
market dynamism became both persistent preoccupations of the Celtic Tiger. 
At the same time, the logic of ethnic/national identity, state formation, and 
state legitimation (2) continued to be reflected in the overarching concern to 
maintain sovereignty and control through what Bourdieu refers to as the mo-
nopoly over symbolic violence (Bourdieu 2014; Loyal and Quilley 2017). 
Simultaneously, positioning itself as an open, cosmopolitan, liberal, and dis-
tinctively Gaelic culture, the policy of the Irish State resonated with (3) a con-
stitutional logic relating to enshrined liberal commitments and the rule of law. 
This was evident in vocal support for 1951 UN Convention on refugees and 
later, for example, the high-profile role of Mary Robinson as President and then 
later (1997-2002) as UN High Commissioner. Finally, with regard to (4) the 
logic of civil society, the Irish State has not been the only actor. Asylum seekers 
themselves, NGOs, and status and class groups supporting, but also challeng-
ing, immigration have been influential in moulding both the political context 
and the development of policy. 
16.  Ireland and Asylum Seekers since the 1990s: 
Conflicting Constructions of Identity and Character 
More recently, the flows of asylum seekers, refugees, and displaced persons 
have grown so rapidly as to constitute what has been deemed a “migration 
crisis.” In its Global Trends Report (2016), the UNHCR recorded a total of 
65.6 million “forcibly displaced people,” including over 40 million “internally 
displaced,” 22.5 million refugees, and 2.3 million asylum seekers. These fig-
ures are the highest number on record. Of these, half the refugees come from 
just three countries: the Syrian Arab Republic (5.5 million), Afghanistan (2.5 
million), and South Sudan (1.4 million). Syria also accounts for 12 million of 
the internally displaced. Over 80% of these refugees were hosted by developing 
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countries with the three largest hosts being Turkey, Pakistan, and Lebanon. On 
a per capita basis, Lebanon was the largest recipient with one in six people in 
the country now a refugee. The vast majority remained outside of Europe, the 
richest continent in the world. Nevertheless, the increasing numbers –1.3 mil-
lion applications in 2015 and 2016 (Eurostat 2017) – have had a profound 
effect, shaking to the core the Schengen vision of a united Europe with no 
internal borders. The previous peak in applications had been 672,000 in 1992, 
following the collapse of Yugoslavia. But significantly, these Balkan refugees 
were Europeans fleeing from an intra-regional crisis. Not surprisingly, the 
reception of relatively huge numbers coming from outside Europe has varied 
considerably. Some countries have accepted very large numbers: Germany took 
722,400 in 2016 (60% of all applicants) which went up from 441,900 in 2015, 
the vast majority from Syria; Austria received 88,360 with about one third of 
these from Syria, constituting the second highest number when measured on a 
per capita basis; Italy followed with 123,000 applications (10.1% of all applica-
tions) largely from Nigeria, Pakistan, and Gambia. Within the EU-28, 1.1 mil-
lion first-instance decisions were processed in 2016, of which 57% led to a 
positive outcome. The leading states for positive outcomes were Slovakia 84% 
and Malta (83%), while the lowest were in Greece, Ireland, Poland, and Hunga-
ry with over 75% rejection rates (European Asylum Office 2017, 222). In 2015, 
Ireland received 1,552 applications for asylum of which only 9.8% were grant-
ed a positive decision at first instance (ORAC 2016). At the same time, there 
was increasing pressure from Germany for EU states to share the burden and 
distribute applications more evenly, especially in respect of those arriving via 
Greece and Italy. Although the EU eventually collectively agreed to accept a 
fixed quota of 160,000 refugees arriving in Italy and Greece in September 
2015, by the end of 2017 only about 28,000 had been redistributed across Eu-
rope, and Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic steadfastly refused to 
comply and accept any refugees. In this context, Ireland agreed to take 4,000 
under the Irish Refugee Protection Programme of which only 1,200 had been 
accepted by the end of 2017. Such socio-political processes intersect with state 
processes of nationalization and economic processes tied to increasing ine-
quality. They entail what Gramsci (1973) calls a “conjunctural” analysis. 
Viewed over several centuries, inequality within Western states has declined 
and power balances between social groups have equalized (Elias 2000). How-
ever, such processes of what Elias calls “functional democratization” need to 
be unpacked. If we see processes of functional democratization with reference 
to gender relations and age distinctions, they have been counterpoised by pro-
cesses of functional de-democratization with regard to political and economic 
processes. Whether the increasing inequality between and within states that has 
accompanied globalization and a policy environment dominated by neo-
liberalism and market retrenchment represents a significant reversal of this 
long-term trajectory is a contested issue (Therborn 2006; Piketty 2014). Ther-
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born has argued that global inequality increased during the 19th century and 
first two-thirds of the 20th, until the economic growth of China with its huge 
population and a decline in the levels of poverty. Certainly, regardless of the 
empirical situation, opinion polls show a consistent perception, among Europe-
ans, that societies are becoming less and not more equal (Khondker 2011, 3). 
Although capitalism has always been “instituted” by nation-states (Polanyi 
1957b), some writers have argued that Western democracies are “hollowing 
out” and becoming more directly dominated by corporate license and less able 
to sustain distinctive internal regulatory environments and societal regimes 
(Jessop 2004). In Ruling the Void, Mair (2013, 1), for example, argues that “the 
age of party democracy has passed.” He continues, “although the parties them-
selves remain, they have become so disconnected from the wider society, and 
pursue a form of competition that is so lacking in meaning, that they no longer 
seem capable of sustaining democracy in its present form.” Others talk of the 
emergence of “post-democracy” (Crouch 2004) in which democratic institu-
tions have been co-opted by a small elite group. If this is the case, we may 
argue that modern Western democracies over the last few decades are begin-
ning to resemble “plutocracies,” as elite groups usurp greater material re-
sources through processes of closure (Barnes 2015). This has had implications 
for the post-war, Fordist state-society compact, particularly, from the 1980s 
onwards, vis-à-vis the arrival of increasing numbers of asylum seekers. Such 
tensions were exacerbated by the worldwide economic downturn, a declining 
rate of profit, and, since 1973, an endemic crisis of profitability (Brenner 
2002).  
With overburdened welfare systems and the continuing legacy of the 2008 
economic crisis, sovereign debt crisis, and the deep institutional crisis of the 
Eurozone, the flow of asylum seekers came at a time of ebbing confidence in 
the institutional and political project of the EU. As Anderson (2009) has rightly 
argued, the origins and impetus underpinning the EU as a supranational frame-
work were for the most part related to the socio-economic priorities of various 
states, especially France and Germany, seeking national-economic advantage 
and prosperity tied to the pooling of resources rather than broader security or 
military concerns, which though of relevance, remained ancillary, as well as 
Monnet’s federalist vision and American patronage. In the context of globaliza-
tion and neo-liberalism, these economic underpinnings, dislocated from demo-
cratic or electoral checks, have produced increasing economic inequality, polit-
ical alienation, and social dislocation. In such a conjuncture, where the EU was 
increasingly bereft of legitimation, the migration crisis gave momentum to the 
growth of populist and far-right parties such as Jobbik in Hungary, United 
Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) in the United Kingdom, the Front Na-
tional in France, the Dutch Freedom Party, Danish People’s Party, the Swedish 
Democrats, and the Alternative für Deutschland and Pegida in Germany. Re-
flecting perhaps more acute historical anxieties about territorial integrity, Hun-
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gary and Bulgaria reintroduced internal borders, built walls, and reinforced 
border security (Jones 2016). Hungary in 2016 was allowing just one asylum 
seeker per day from Serbia to cross into each of its two transit zones. The more 
recent rise of far-right parties and discourses across Europe is one indication of 
this scramble over resources and reassertion of ethno-national status differen-
tials often dubbed “populism” through which groups distinguish between “the 
masses” and an out of touch “elite.” This extraordinary pan-European move-
ment and trans-Atlantic containing a specific “discursive and stylistic reper-
toire” (Brubaker 2017, 357) in which individuals and states claim to act and 
speak on behalf of the “people” has been expressed in Brexit, the rise of 
Trump, and the emergence of the far-right and, to a lesser extent, left (for ex-
ample Podemos in France, Syriza in Greece). It followed a decade of “Third 
way” politics enunciated most fully by Giddens (1996). This national-populist 
conjuncture is often predicated on a distinction between self and other based 
solely on narrow national terms, as states continue to articulate national charac-
ter. However, in the current ideological conjuncture, a broader civilizational 
discourse, especially between a reactionary Islam against a Christianised secu-
larism and liberalism, has emerged (Brubaker 2017). The latter promotes gay 
rights, democracy, separation of Church and state, freedom of speech, gender 
equality, etc. while the former is deemed to represent an Islamic, retrograde 
extremism. Such a binary “populist” civilizational discourse has been articulat-
ed both by politicians such as Pim Fortuyn but also political parties of the right 
who have surged in popularity such as French National Front, the Austrian 
Freedom Party, The Dutch Party for Freedom, Pegida/AfD in Germany, PiS – 
Party of Law and Justice in Poland, and 5 Star and Salvini’s League Party in 
Italy. Here, outsiders and external forces be it globalization, unfettered trade, 
the EU, or radical Islam, are construed as threatening a way of life and the 
security of ordinary people. What they partly express and articulate is renewed 
forms of social and citizenship closure aimed at securing greater material and 
ideal resources in the face of increasing economic globalization, including the 
movement of labour. Here, discourses of nationalism, articulated by the state, 
are rearticulating with ethno-racial forms of discrimination. As Miles notes in 
discussing the latter process in another context, such discrimination  
facilitate[s] the ideological identification of certain social strata within the 
subordinate classes (which are defined as belonging and therefore as having a 
natural right of access to scarce rights and resources) with the institutions re-
sponsible for the organization of production and distribution of material re-
sources and political rights (i.e. with capitalists and the institutions of local 
and national state). (Miles 1993, 102) 
Equally, in his discussion of social closure Wimmer puts it thus: 
Periodically this institutional arrangement and the nationalistic self-image as-
sociated with it run into a crisis; the social compact breaks up, because the 
balance of forces between the different groups has changed in the course of 
economic and political developments [...] One of these projects consists of re-
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both material (economic) and ideal (status) processes: that is, processes of 
redistribution in terms of access to private property and credentials, strategies 
of recognition, and social distinction, which are often misleadingly separated 
(Fraser and Honneth 2004). Such struggles have taken place primarily through 
social closure and counter-usurpation strategies which themselves both express 
and reflect differences in power and degrees of social organization and estab-
lished-outsider relations. 
What our discussion between the state and asylum seekers has demonstrated 
is the existence of a number of structural contradictions. Such contradictions do 
not necessarily lead to a resolution at some higher level (Hegel’s “Aufgeho-
ben”). Instead, they point to the existence of various entrenched wicked di-
lemmas, that is, paradoxical and irreconcilable tensions between two or more 
cherished but irreconcilable structural priorities. Liberal nation-states are 
obliged to follow both human rights principles and popular sovereignty. There 
are irresolvable tensions between the freedom of movement and the right or 
necessity to restrict entry, and also between a “society of individuals” and 
ethno-national/racial and class group stratification and imaginaries. There are 
other intertwined wicked problems pitting liberal conservatives, liberals, and 
social democrats on the horns of a dilemma, not least: balancing the conflicting 
interests of present and future generations; the tension between exclusive 
membership criteria for citizenship and ethical obligations qua common hu-
manity; the tension between the supranational EU and national state interests; 
the tension between juris soli and juris sanguine; the apparent incompatibility 
of the cosmopolitan outlook of educated and (usually wealthy) liberal univer-
salists or the internationalism of socialists on the one hand, and the security and 
resource-focused imaginaries of hard-nosed hawks or downwardly mobile or 
disadvantaged groups on the other; and the tension between the need for free 
flows of capital to nurture an expanding and innovative economy and the place-
bound imaginaries that legitimate the process of fiscal redistribution. Moreo-
ver, the state itself expresses these contradictions as a multi-layered, multidi-
mensional “entity in process,” a field of contradictory forces enshrined in vari-
ous state departments with sometimes coherent, sometimes contradictory 
agendas concerning the distribution of economic resources, rights, opportuni-
ties, and recognition (Bourdieu 2014). 
In Ireland, the looming Brexit negotiations and reworking of the Common 
Travel Area with Britain will have dramatic implications for the management 
of immigration, perhaps indicating change in the UK’s understanding of immi-
gration to a European one. But the European system faces its own dilemmas. In 
2015, Sweden and Germany welcomed an unprecedented number of refugees. 
The state has not imploded. Their economies continue to thrive. But there has 
been a sharp rise in support for populist parties’ (the Swedish Democrats [SD] 
and the Alternative für Deutschland [AfD]) advancing programmes aimed 
squarely at the constituencies of the traditional left and particularly in the case 
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of the SD (as with the Front National under Marine Le Pen in France), and 
predicated on a zero sum between a welfare compact organized around an 
exclusive ethno-national form of social solidarity and the liberal commitment 
to the free movement of people linked to a globalizing acceptance of the free 
movement of capital. It may be that these countries manage to integrate new 
ethnic minority communities and develop an open, republican, cosmopolitan 
civic nationalism. It seems just as plausible that over the coming decades there 
will be a shift away from a solidaristic class politics of security and redistribu-
tion rooted in an easy and unreflective “imagined community” based on taken-
for-granted and “common sense” understandings of German-ness or Swedish-
ness. It is impossible to say with any certainty which, if either, scenario will 
play out in the context of rising popular resentment. This will all depend on the 
class and status group struggles over hegemony and moral and intellectual 
leadership which take place on the conjunctural terrain. Immigration has come 
to stand as a metonym, a condensation, of wider neo-liberal practices of dereg-
ulation and the social and economic uprooting and dislocation this has caused. 
It is in this conjuncture in which every-day struggles for resources to look after 
oneself, and for those closest to one, have intensified and increased strategies 
of ethno-national status distinction and socio-economic closure. In the extant 
hegemonic order, immigration offers a potent “frame” through which certain 
groups make practical sense of the declining control they have over their eve-
ryday lives. But what is certain is that conflicts between and within states over 
unequal material resources and recognition, between classes and various ethno- 
racial status groupings, generating both intended and unintended outcomes and 
effects, will continue to play themselves out on the basis of diverse strategies 
and power struggles. This is especially in the context of an absence of discus-
sion concerning progressive national and international economic regulation 
centered on production for need rather than profit. Protagonists on all sides of 
these debates would do well to remember the complexity of the interplay be-
tween economics, politics, and culture and the fact that societal outcomes usu-
ally have only a tenuous relationship with political intentions. In this field, 
unintended consequences are, for better or for worse, very much the rule. 
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